European institutions create policies which stimulate rent-seeking. So the emergence of a Europeanized interest group system can be primarily explained by rent-seeking behavior. One example of this type of argument is Bouwen's theory of access which explains the emergence of a European interest group system by the ability of groups to deliver specific access goods, i.e. pieces of information which are useful for policymaking (Bouwen 2002) . Also other studies point to the importance of resources (Eising 2003 (Eising /2004 . Indeed, as EU policies are often quite demanding in term of technical expertise needed in order to gain influence, it is reasonable to expect that especially well-endowed interest groups are able to make use of the opportunities provided by the European multilevel system. Disparities in resources lead to disparities in the Europeanization of interest groups. This resource argument strongly emphasizes the capabilities of groups to organize and extends these capabilities into the institutional nature of the EU-system which is said to disadvantage or advantage some groups compared to others. This argument comes with an important underlying assumption, namely that whenever the incentives and resources are present interest group adaptation will follow.
Without denying the potential relevance and validity of these claims, we argue that scholars studying the Europeanization of national interest groups often tend to overemphasize the effect of EU-level institutions or European policies. Moreover, most empirical studies rely on a rather narrow sample of interest groups that might Europeanize their political strategies. Most studies focus on one policy sector and are limited to one sort of interest group, often business interests. Very few studies make an effort to compare different sorts of groups systematically, and comparative studies across EU member states are even more rare. The disadvantage is of course that this limits the number of variables that can be investigated in empirical tests on organizational adaptation.
In this paper we argue that even though the EU creates many new opportunities for domestic groups to adapt as well as numerous incentives in that sense, Europeanization is not a natural or immediate response (Ladrech 2005) . Thus, instead of a logic of influence, we emphasize that the Europeanization of interest groups is substantially affected by a logic of organizational maintenance. It is interesting in this regard to note that much attention has been paid to the logic of organizational maintenance in explaining the varying extent of Europeanization by political parties as compared to interest groups (Mair 2000, 41-7) . With regard to political parties it is argued that their almost exclusive dependence on voters -their critical constituency and resourceties them strongly to the domestic level. In contrast, domestic interest groups are generally much less encumbered than parties in terms of solving their main resource problem and are therefore, considered as being more Europeanized (Ladrech 2005, 321-2) . But not all domestic interest groups are the same in this regard and critical resource dependencies may help explain why that is the case.
What we illustrate with this paper is that interest groups can be tied to their environment in very different ways and that their structural embeddedness has significant and substantial explanatory power for Europeanization. In the literature on European interest groups, it is for instance often argued that there is a relationship between spatial boundedness and Europeanization. The commitment to places/territories (for instance in case one gets funding, information or other goods from domestic institutions or when policy problems are defined as having causes situated at the local level) leads to integration within existing territorial circumscriptions (such as the nation-state), something which, according Marks and McAdam, happens with respect to labor unions (Marks and McAdam 1999) . When actors conceive issues of a transnational nature, or if actors are not very dependent on domestic agents, they will be less embedded in the domestic institutional environment and more easily Europeanize.
In this paper we demonstrate that a focus on critical resource dependencies might be useful in order to understand the Europeanization of domestic interest groups. In the next two section of the paper we elaborate this argument further and we present some examples from the existing literature that point to the importance of critical resource dependencies. In the third part of the paper we present our research design. This is followed by some analyses which support the claim that critical resource dependencies are important for a large set of interest organizations. We conclude with some ideas on future research.
Conceptualization
Our research project starts from the assumption that key for understanding the mobilization of societal interests is the fit between the interest characteristics (e.g. the nature of critical constituencies, resource dependencies and sectoral affinities), and the legal, organizational and institutional context in which societal interests have to operate (Walker 1991) .
Several authors have suggested that the EU-level, or some of its institutions such as the European Parliament, provides opportunities for societal interests that are peripheral and weakly organized at the domestic level (Marks and McAdam 1996; Marks and McAdam 1999; Fairbrass and Jordon 2001 ; see also Keck and Sikkink 1998) . In order to realize the organization's goals, which includes both organizational maintenance and policy influence, interest groups start to expand the scope of their activities and Europeanize their activities. Indeed, European institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament need information from the domestic level (technical advice, information about political support, potential compliance problems), but also domestic political players at the EU-level (ministers and bureaucrats in the Council of Ministers) are keen to stay in touch with the domestic actors. By being active on European issues domestic interest groups strengthen their domestic position as this enables them to provide crucial information to domestic public officials.
In contrast, we argue that such a compensation-effect is not the only or not the dominant pattern. For instance, with regard to the EU some authors have argued that opportunities/constraints situated at the domestic level affect the propensity of domestic interest groups to adapt and to respond effectively to new opportunities situated at or coming from the EU-level (Kohler-Koch 1997, 3; Sidenius 1999; Cram 2001; Eising 2003) . In an earlier paper, we demonstrated that the Europeanization of network-strategies developed by domestic interest groups follows a cumulative pattern (Beyers 2002, 601-3) . This implies that, generally, domestic networks are activated first and that domestic mobilization takes place before actors start to Europeanize their policy networks. In general, networking among domestic interest groups prevails and seeking access to national officials, especially the national government is crucial. It is only after the establishment of domestic networks that interest groups start to extend their networks to the European level. Domestic interest groups do not Europeanize because they are unable to realize, i.e. compensate, their goals at the domestic level. Moreover, some domestic interest groups do not need to Europeanize because they are still able to realize many of their political goals at the domestic level. Indeed, many crucial policy areas -such as social welfare provision, cultural policy, labor market regulation -are still excluded from the EU agenda (see Moravscik 2002, 607) . Europe is not an alternative, but something that can be complementary to an ongoing process of interest mobilization (Ladrech 2005) . This implies that, generally spoken, adaptation or Europeanization will be highly dependent on their immediate organizational environment. Moreover, Europeanized domestic interest groups will strengthen their domestic position only if they maintain, stay in touch with and cultivate their domestic networks. Thus, Europeanization always includes a need to remain active at the domestic level as well.
The argument that Europeanization is shaped by the immediate organizational environment ties in to a more general theoretical account on critical resource dependencies. Most organizations are not internally selfsufficient and maintaining sufficient resources is a daily concern for them (Bouwen 2000) . Organizations extract resources from their environment, resources that are supplied by other actors such as government (subsidies), membership fees or gifts and donations. Gaining resources is costly and demanding. It requires an investment and interactions with actors providing such resources. It is important to note that gaining resources through exchange networks has rather ambiguous consequences for the actor's autonomy. On the one hand, extracting resources from the environment can be seen as something that strengthens the actors' position vis-à-vis others as more resources lead to more capabilities and more autonomy. On the other hand, resource dependencies can also be considered as something that reproduces or even strengthens existing dependencies. In this sense, gaining resources decreases autonomy and the propensity to expand the scope of attention towards policies and institutions which transcend the national level. The major weakness of a simple resource-based perspective that ignores critical dependencies, is that it assumes that interest groups are always prepared to modify and Europeanize their strategies as soon as their material self-interests would require or their resources would enable them do so. However, this neglects the possibility that actors refrain from going beyond the domestic level, because they are in need of, identify with or are loyal to their domestic resource suppliers.
A more general perspective on this matter is Hirschman's exit, voice and loyalty framework which has been applied by several EU-scholars (Hirschman 1970; Bennett 1999; Trondal and Veggeland 2003; Bartolini 2004; Kohler-Koch 2005) . The idea is -in a nutshell -that the process of European integration provides opportunities for domestic interest groups so that they are able to exit the iron cage of domestic politics and voice their concerns at the national level. However, organizations that are highly dependent on benefits they get from their immediate environment and/or that are highly connected to domestic constituencies which gain individual and collective benefits, show a low propensity to exit the domestic level. Being Europeanized is therefore typical for groups that offer less direct benefits to their members. Also organizations that are for their survival weakly dependent on domestic institutions (for instance because of the subsidies they get), will more easily transcend national borders. Thus, it is not necessarily the absence or the modesty of key resources that explains the low or high level of Europeanization. Key is that interest groups, whether they are resourceful or not, should be less dependent on resources or benefits they gain from their immediate environment.
To put it differently, rather than the amount of available resources available, it is, in Hirschman's framework, the presence or absence of exit-options at the national level that affects the extent to which organizations are Europeanized. Only organizations that solved their resource problem will be able to exit the domestic level and Europeanize their voice. Interest groups that strongly depend on their domestic environment have an alternative to exit, namely domestic voice. Because of their dependence on interactions with domestic public actors and constituencies, such groups will prioritize their immediate social environment. The political orientation of these groups is basically situated at the domestic level. For instance, they may try to influence voters, shape domestic public opinion, attract new members or put pressure on domestic governmental actors who depend on their support and loyalty. According to Hirschman's model voice is positively related to loyalty and both voice and loyalty function as threshold to exit or Europeanization. The more loyal actors have to be vis-à-vis their immediate environment, the less exit-options they have, the more they voice their concerns domestically and the less Europeanized they will be.
Hypotheses
Even if it is often argued that especially resourceful organizations are able to Europeanize, we argue that it is not necessarily size or resources that matter. More important is how organizations are structurally connected or tied to their environment. More in particular, we emphasize how strong an organization depends on its members/constituencies for its survival, the sector in which its main activities are located, and the dependence for their resources on institutional actors in their immediate environment. For the moment, we identify three key factors (members/constituents, resource dependencies and sector) of which some will be analyzed in the empirical sections below.
First, the relation between interest groups and members/constituencies is crucial. Does the interest group depend on its members and constituencies for its survival? For instance, the more an interest group is dependent on individual members to carry out management functions, and to help with campaigning, the more this group needs to be locally embedded in order to recruit these people. Then, a well-elaborated local network is needed in order to recruit, thereby creating the probability that not much energy will be left to invest in Europe. Also, if organizations have as their main task to deliver specific services or benefits to their members, they will be more locally embedded (and relatively weakly Europeanized). Some benefits will constrain Europeanization as they may require an interest group to focus on the one political system (for instance getting subsidies). Social security and welfare provisions are cases in mind. Advocacy with regard to policy areas where competencies are divided between the member states and the EU (see third point) requires a multi-level approach or increases pressure on domestic interest groups to take such an approach into consideration.
Second, the exclusivity of monetary resources can be quite relevant for an organization too. Cram, for instance, refers to the issue of funds organizations gain from domestic sources (Cram 2001) . She argues that national organizations that receive large amounts of money form their national government are not very autonomous, but that the other extreme, no funding at all prevents organizations to carry their tasks. In the latter case, the lack of funding explains the lack of Europeanization (as well as domestic political activity) while in the former case it explains the key attention organizations have for domestic institutions and their access to these.
It is this pattern that explains the fact that for some EU member states, Cram names Greece, only a few government sponsored organizations dominate the relations with the EU. So one of our key questions concerns whether interest groups gain money from various sources and/or whether groups depend strongly on one kind of source? If one domestic funding source is predominant, does it concern government subsidies, individual membership fees or other sources of income? The dependence on domestic public institutions is a factor that affects the absence or presence of exit options and the potential Europeanization of an interest group. The more domestic interest groups depend on resources exclusively provided by government agencies such as subsidies, the more these groups restrict their actions to the domestic political system. Third, the importance of domestic constituents is to a large extent colored by the policy-sector in which an actor is active. Research carried out by Bennett among firms provides some clues. He has shown that businesses differ with respect to the political route they choose in response to the geographical location of their main interests (Bennett 1999) . Firms that are situated in a sector that is weakly internationalized, in which domestic protection (for instance through regulation or redistributive policies) plays a major role, where industry is concentrated in one country, or where there are clear national interests, were more likely to rely on national modes of interest representation instead of European ones. Such firms were also less likely to Europeanize their strategies. A similar argument applies for how policy competencies are divided within the EU. Some interest groups are active in policy domains where EU competencies are weak or non-existent and where most policy benefits are realized by national governments. Such groups will not need to Europeanize, while groups that are active in strongly Europeanized sectors will ceterus paribus adapt more. That means that we should find more Europeanization in for instance the sector of competition policies or the environment than in the social security sector.
Research design
The data we use in this paper are part of a larger research project on how interest groups interact with public actors in four EU member states (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) as well at the EUlevel. The focus is thereby on the efforts these groups make to influence the EU's external trade policies in the World Trade Organization (WTO), more particularly in the areas of agriculture, steel/metal and services. One part of this larger project tries to find out whether and if so, how national interest groups have 'Europeanized' their political strategies. Data collection has been based on a large elite-survey conducted in these four member states between May 2003 and February 2006 . In this section, we briefly outline some basic characteristics of this research. We indicate how the fieldwork was conducted and how the interest groups were sampled.
One of the problems with elite-surveying concerns the identification of a relevant sample of interest groups. As part of our research questions can only be dealt with in a comparative design, we needed crosssectional samples that are structurally equivalent and comparable across countries. For each country and the EU-level we aimed at a final sample of 120 completed interviews; 20 with public officials and 100 with interest groups.
i In addition to this we tried to get a diverse sample with a large variety of interest groups including NGOs, public interests, business interests and labor interests.
Basically, our sample is constructed on the basis of a positional sampling technique for which we screened a large amount of formal sources.
ii From all these sources only interest groups were retained; think tanks, institutes, policy centers, media actors and individual firms were not considered. There is of course overlap among the different sources. Each interest group has been coded once as soon as the group was mentioned in one of the sources. All these interest groups were coded on the basis of a number of variables such as type of interests (employers, trade unions, NGOs), policy sector in which the group is active and so on.
For this, a coding frame was established beforehand and coding occurred through an interactive process among the researchers that included an extensive consultation of external sources (such as monographs, websites and experts).
The established list, however, does not correspond with the sample we had in mind. Two major problems had to be solved.
First, the list was too large as it contains several highly specialized business interest groups that had no link at all to the policy-sectors in which we are interested (external trade policies with regard to agriculture, steel/metal and services). Regarding sectoral business and labor interests we only retained those sectoral associations that have a direct (agriculture/food industry, metal/steel, services) or an indirect link (transport and retailing/distribution) with the policy sectors on which the research project focuses. NGOs were retained in the sample as well as cross-sectoral specific interest groups (such as cross-sectoral employer unions, trade unions and associations representing SME's).
Second, there was a risk that our sources would generate a biased sample with regard to access and mobilization; less visible and less active organizations run the risk to be excluded.
iii This risk was particularly high for trade unions. Although trade unions play an active part in domestic politics (especially in neo-corporatist countries such as Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands), they were barely named in the sources mentioned above. In order to redress this potential bias, we proceeded as follows. First, for all international and European umbrella organizations mentioned in one of the above sources, we checked whether or not their European or domestic members were already included. If not, they were added. Second, for the three policy sectors, we investigated the potential cleavages so that our sample would include varying and/or opposing policy positions.
In order to identify the actors connected to these cleavages we used the relational data-set compiled by Bernhard Wessels (Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin) which links Euro-level associations to their domestic members (Wessels 2004) . Finally, we consulted a number of experts (especially with respect to trade unions) and checked the composition of key advisory bodies at the domestic and the EU-level (such as the EU's Economic and Social Committee) in order to fine-tune the sample with regard to trade unions. Table 1 gives an overview of the results of our fieldwork. Interviews were conducted on the basis of a standardized questionnaire with almost all questions being closed. Key parts of the questionnaire dealt with different characteristics of the political system within which the actors operate, the policy positions of actors with respect to twenty policy issues, their political strategies (including both traditional forms of lobbying as well as outside lobbying) in relation to these issues, the resources actors had at their disposal and invested in political activities, and their embeddedness in domestic and/or European policy networks (by social network analysis). In this article only a small subset of the variables will be used. It concerns those that are related to resource dependencies and Europeanization. 
Findings
We focus the analysis of our findings on the relationship between the level of Europeanization on the one hand, and the following variables on the other hand: (a) the type of interest group; (b) the nature and the extent of the group's resource dependencies; and (c) the policy domains in which these groups claim to have an interest. In the first part of the analysis we describe how different interest groups show a different level of Europeanization. Then we investigate the critical resource dependencies of different sorts of interest groups. Finally, we correlate resource dependencies and policy sector interest with the extent to which groups are Europeanized.
As indicated above, we define Europeanization as the extent to which an interest group acknowledges the impact of Europe and/or the extent to which an interest group takes this impact into account. In table 2 and 3 we briefly describe the 'Europeanization' of Belgian, Dutch, German and French interest groups. We asked each organization official to what extent the organization's focus of attention is directed towards EU policies, the impact of EU-level decisions on the organization, and the extent to which the organization monitors EU policies. It appears that EU policies are generally seen as having an important impact on most organizations (between 69 and 88 percent). However, there are significant differences between the four member states. Compared to their Belgian and Dutch counterparts, more German and French interest groups claim to experience a marked impact and more German and French groups monitor European policies. We also asked our respondent to indicate the share of their overall time and energy they spend on European policies. These data indicate that on average, German and French interest groups pay more attention to Europe than Belgian and Dutch groups (see figure 1) . A factor analysis of these four variables results in one factor that explains 39 percent of the total variance. We will use the factors scores for further analyses. The lower the factor scores, the more Europeanized groups are. Note that the distributions within the four member states on these factor scores fit into the pattern described above. Note also the differences across the four countries (see figure 2) . Groups in the two larger member states tend to be more Europeanized than their counterparts from the smaller member states. Further, the differences within Belgium and the Netherlands are considerably higher than the differences within France and Germany, something that is indicated by the standard deviations for Belgium (.87), the Netherlands (.88), Germany (.73), and France (.69). In sum, the differences between the group types and the four countries are quite considerable. Our next step consists of analyzing the critical resource dependencies of the interest groups across the four countries. Table 4 shows the result for five potential income sources: (1) individual membership contributions and individual donations, (2) membership fees from companies, (3) government subsidies, (4) income from economic activities (such as the payments for services provided, revenue generated by the sale of goods, and the returns of investments and savings…), and (5) income from institutions and organizational entrepreneurs (such as donations by firms, organizations, or charities). Table 4 should be read as follows: 82 percent of Belgian NGOs get their funding from government subsidies and among these 82 percent, government subsidies represent an average share of 57 percent of their budget. Trade unions have some other sources of income too, but these are much less important in comparison to the individual membership fees. In other words, trade unions are critically dependent on such fees.
NGOs, in contrast, have a more diversified structure of income. A large majority of them depends on government subsidies. It should be noted however, that this dependency is much larger in Belgium and the Netherlands than in Germany and France. In the small countries, 76 and 82 percent of the NGOs depend on such subsidies and for those that do, such subsidies represent an average of 57 to 59 percent of their overall income. In Germany and France, 68 percent of NGO's rely on this source of income. And in the cases where they do, such income represents between 42 and 45 percent of their overall budget. Given this result, one could plausibly claim that the Belgian and Dutch NGO's are more critically dependent on government subsidies than NGOs in France and Germany. The picture is reversed for individual membership contributions. The lower reliance of French and German NGO's on government subsidies is compensated by a higher dependency on individual membership contributions (up to 48 percent of their overall income).
Finally, business interests and employers associations show an even higher level of diversity in their sources of income. What is striking here is the low dependency on membership fees paid by companies. Although more than 50 percent of the organizations receive an income from such fees, this source represents less that 10 percent of their budget on average. Quite a substantial share of the business associations depend on fees paid by individual members but this dependency is less substantial than the trade union's dependency on such fees. Yet, a substantial difference exists between the small and the large member states. In the small member states individual membership fees tend to be much more important for the average business association than in the larger ones.
Now that we have compared the critical resource dependencies of different interest groups, it is important to look how these groups perceive these dependencies. Perceptions on such dependencies may matter a lot in the choices organizations make on their activities and in the extent to which concerns about organizational maintenance guide these choices. For that purpose a question was asked about the organization's perception on budget competition. Does the organization experience budget competition from others and if so, how strong is this competition perceived to be? Table 5 compares the perceived level of budget competition for the three types of interest groups and for each of the four countries. One of the first things that strike the eye is that those organizations that have the most diverse stream of income and that are the least dependent on their critical constituency -employers' organizations -perceive on average the lowest level of budget competition. On average, NGOs and, especially, trade unions are much more likely to perceive 'moderate' or 'strong' budget competition.
However, there are considerable differences among trade unions. The German trade unions are somewhat atypical as they demonstrate, compared to the French, Dutch and Belgian trade unions, a much lower level of perceived budget competition. This might be due to the fact that the German trade union system is much more centralized and that one German trade union -the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund -occupies a representation monopoly within the German neocorporatist constellation. Therefore, it does not face budget competition at least not as far as individual member contributions are concerned. Belgium and the Netherlands have a more fragmented trade union system with three trade unions each representing a substantial part of labor. In Belgium and the Netherlands, no single organization has been able to dominate the niche of labor representation. France, in contrast, combines a highly fragmented system, ideological radicalism with a low level of unionization. Given the high number of trade union organizations in France and given the fact that each trade union seeks to maintain its own ideological niche, it seems reasonable to assume that the French trade unions develop their own specialized ideological niche. This might explain why the average French trade union perceives less budget competition compared to Belgian and Dutch trade unions. What is the relationship between, on the one hand, perceived budget competition and resource dependencies and, on the other hand, the levels of Europeanization? As indicated above, given the fact that monitoring European policies is quite demanding it is plausible to expect a relationship between Europeanization and resources. Yet, a comparison of table 4 and 5 with the data on Europeanization in figure 1 and 2 suggests that a lower perceived budget competition corresponds with a lower dependency on a critical resource provider as well as with a more Europeanized orientation among interest groups. This seems to happen with regard to business interests, but also to some extent with regard to the French and the German trade unions. Especially the Dutch/Belgian NGOs and trade unions combine a high level of perceived budget competition with a strong dependency on one critical resource, namely government subsidies or individual membership fees. Typical for them is their generally low level of Europeanization.
We measured the amount of resources in two ways. One consists of the size of the available budget, but the problem with this measure however is that quite a number of respondents refuse to answer to this question. The other consists of the number of full-time equivalents (FTE) employed by the organization. Here we have complete data and the very high correlation with budget size (r=.89, p=.0001) suggests that staff resource is a valid indicator or an organization's resources. Table 6 , first row, provides the correlations of this variable with the level of Europeanization. No statistically significant correlations can be found, except in the case of Germany where we observe a small and slightly significant correlation between a large staff resource and a low Europeanization factor-score (r=-.22, p=.0475, which implies a higher level of Europeanization). Only in Germany we observe that a larger staff resource corresponds with higher levels of Europeanization. So the impact of resources is not a simple and straightforward linear relationship. It is not because the staff resource doubles, that also the lobby-effort or the 'Europeanization' doubles. Monitoring a policy domain or expanding the scope of attention demands some fixed costs and possibly each resource added may have a declining impact once some initial investment has already been made (Brasher and Lowery 2005) .
In contrast, we find more substantial correlations between the perceived level of budget competition and Europeanization for Belgium (r=.22, p=.0110), the Netherlands (r=.34, p=.0004) and Germany (r=.37, p=.0006). Only, in the case of France, there is, probably due to a low standard deviation, no substantial association. The results for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany indicate that lower levels of Europeanization correlate with higher levels of perceived budget competition. Interest groups that perceive severe budget competition feel themselves more vulnerable in terms of their organizational maintenance; such groups tend to be less Europeanized. It is useful then to take a closer look at these critical dependencies and their relationship with Europeanization. Table 6 provides the necessary information.
As is indicated by this table, we observe statistically significant correlations for individual membership contributions, company membership contributions, and government subsidies. However, the results for individual membership contributions are unclear. German organizations that depend on individual membership fees are less Europeanized, but this pattern is repeated in no other country. In the case of France, declining levels of Europeanization correspond with a growing importance of individual membership contributions in the overall income of interest associations, while in Belgium, the opposite takes place. There, Europeanization increases with the rising importance of individual contributions as a source of income.
The results with respect to company membership contributions and government subsidies are more straightforward, results which confirm some of our earlier observations. Organizations that depend on company membership are more Europeanized, a finding which reflects the fact that especially business associations -those whose primary constituency basically consists of firms -are quite strongly Europeanized. Important here is that dependency in terms of the proportion of company membership to the organizations' overall budget has no effect on Europeanization.
Consequently, a dependency on membership contributions from companies cannot be considered as a critical resource in the sense that it does not constrain Europeanization. Again with the exception of France, organizations that depend on government subsidies are less Europeanized.
Moreover, in Belgium and the Netherlands, the countries where many organizations (especially NGOs) are highly dependent on government subsidies, we find that the larger the share of government subsidies in the organization's budget, the less the interest group monitors policies which originate at the European level. Governments do not provide such subsidies for altruistic reasons. As neopluralists would claim, they do so because they believe that imbalances in societal input need to be corrected. And when they assess such imbalances, they use a national framework. Interest associations that depend on government subsidies know this. As a consequence, they will prioritize their immediate national environment in the first place and less time and energy will be left to focus on Europe. At a more general level, these findings confirm that organizational maintenance and critical resource dependencies are crucial factors for understanding the Europeanization of national interest organizations.
Our final research question concerns the policy domains in which an interest group claims to have the most interest. In order to be successful interest groups need to realize benefits for their member and constituents. For some interest groups these benefits need to be realized at the European level, while for others benefits must be realized at the domestic level. Presumably, groups with a large stake in the social security sector or labor market regulation and organizations whose influence activities affect the welfare benefits of their clients -for example trade unionsfocus more on the policy level where key decision with regard to social security and labor market regulation are taken. In contrast, national business organizations increasingly represent transnational and European companies that are active within the borders of a member state. These groups depend for the well-being of their constituents on how the European internal market operates. Being active in and being dependent on the international economy fosters Europeanization. In addition to the interest in a specific policy domain we hypothesize that Europeanization relates to the organization's expansiveness. One could argue that Europeanization occurs especially among those organizations that are able to expand the scope of their policy interest, i.e. interest groups that are multiple niche players and have a broad niche width.
During the interviews the respondents were asked to screen a list with policy areas in which they could be active. For each area the respondent was asked to indicate how important this particular policy area is for the organization. 'Importance' was defined as 'having invested many resources in this particular policy domain (for example in terms of research, hiring staff…)' and respondents scaled importance on a 5-point score, a low score implying high levels of interest. Consequently, a positive correlation between importance attributed to a policy area and 'Europeanization' means that being active in a specific policy area contributes to the Europeanization of an interest group. In addition, we create a variable, scope of policy, which simply measures the number of policy areas in which an interest group claims to be active. Accordingly, a negative correlation indicates that a large niche width corresponds to Europeanization. Table 7 shows the results and indicates that the division of competencies between the EU and the member states affects the Europeanization of national interest groups. The substantial correlations for competition policies, export policies and environmental policies illustrate that these are, at least among interest groups, highly Europeanized policy areas. Similar observations, although less outspoken in terms of correlational strength (especially for France), can be done for consumer policy, industrial policies, and research and development. So groups that are active in policy sectors with some substantial and significant EU competencies show higher levels of Europeanization.
For policy areas that are highly dependent on governmental regulations, subsidies and allowances such as social security, employment policy, media and cultural policy, we observe no significant relation between importance and Europeanization. Table 7 , however, also shows that there are significant differences between the four member states. The same holds for the correlation between scope of attention and the level of Europeanization. The results indicate that a broader scope of attention tends to result in higher levels of Europeanization, with the relation being substantially higher in the case of the Netherlands, and substantially lower in the case of France. The moderate and sometimes low value of the correlation coefficients -even in some sectors where the EU has substantial competencies such as agriculture and fisheries -equally suggests that even in cases where interest groups consider these policy sectors to be important, Europeanization does not automatically follow. These results confirm our third proposition, namely that Europeanization is considerably constrained by a dependence on domestic policies. When we look to the type of groups interests in the least Europeanized policy areas we find predominantly labor unions; between 77 and 98 percent of the interviewed trade union officials claimed to be interested in social security, labor market regulation, and fiscal policies. In contrast, the interest for these policy areas is much lower among NGOs, but also among employers interest (here between 25 and 40 percent of the interviewed groups claims to be 'interested' or 'strongly interested').
Conclusions
The good news about is that Europeanization is not necessarily a privilege for large and resourceful organizations that are able to Europeanize. In this regard, we have to be careful with far-fetched conclusions in terms of resources driving the process toward Europeanization. Although, our empirical results do not reject the rent-seeking argument, they illustrate that scope expansion or Europeanization is much more complex and contextualized than the mere existence of European stimuli.
Of the three key factors we identified, two factors have a clear and substantial relationship with Europeanization. Although a dependency on individual members and constituents has no direct relation with our dependent variable, we showed that especially trade unions that depend strongly on individuals and that operate in a context with more budget competition -namely in Belgium, the Netherlands and France -were less Europeanized than German trade unions which are more monopolistic. The perception of budget competition and some critical resource dependencies are more salient than resources as such. With regard to critical resource dependencies we observed that in particular a dependency on government subsidies constrains Europeanization. This association is most outspoken in Belgium and the Netherlands, two countries where the organizations that depend considerably on subsides, namely NGOs, face severe budget competition.
Finally, we observed that policy domain matters. Some interest groups are strongly tied to policy sectors where EU competencies are weak or non-existent and where most benefit are realized by national governments These groups are less pressured to Europeanize, not because they do not have resources or because they do not appreciate European rents, but simply because they are still able to realize many of their political goals at the domestic level.
We started from the general notion that the Europeanization of domestic interest groups can be explained by investigating the link between the interest characteristics (e.g. the nature of critical constituencies, resource dependencies and sectoral affinities) and the immediate organizational environment of these groups.
The empirical results show that in addition to the potential impact of the EU institutions themselves, more research attention has to be paid to the immediate context of a group and more in particular their critical resource dependencies. True, our empirical results remain somewhat illustrative and the analyses was presumably conducted a rather high level of abstraction. We think that the next research steps could consist of two parts. First, as very little is known about the domestic interest group population of different European countries, detailed theory-driven case-studies are needed in order to enrich and refine some of the more general conclusions we arrive at. Second, for the moment we have neglected concrete political behavior, political strategies and tactics. In order to rebalance the underestimation of organizational maintenance without ignoring the relevance of the external political environment, more detailed theoretical and empirical research on the relation between specific political strategies and critical resource dependencies might be fruitful.
i Our research project also includes public officials and how they interact with interest groups, but because public officials are not directly relevant for the problem we deal with in this paper, we do not pay extensive attention the interviews conducted with them.
ii Because the larger project deals with trade policymaking we especially focused on sources which list interest groups that are potentially active in this sector. The WTO-website (www.wto.org) contains a number of useful sources ranging from listings of interest groups and civil society organizations attending ministerial conferences, expert meetings, position papers delivered to the WTO and so on. These sources included: iii However, it should be noted that some of our sources, such as the EU's Civil Society Dialogue, have a very low access barrier as it mainly functions as a registration database.
